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Cake day: March 28th, 2024

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  • Sure reviewing changes is easy. But the problem is that it is still a review. You need to have an understanding of what exactly is being done and to account for any oddities that may or may not be because of the quirks of upstream. That’s why I mentioned that AUR trust models should be made like pacman for most helper. We trust the maintainer of Arch so why can’t we trust other people too? Take PPA, the trust model is exactly that. You trust the maintainer. At the very least make it an option that you can choose on first run


  • All of that wouldn’t have any effect if the aur helper mimics the model of pacman. Trust the maintainer, not the build script. By requiring users to review PKGBUILD every time it changes, it encourages laziness. But by requiring the review only once then trusting the maintainer, it helps a lot because the only way an attack can be done is directly attacking infrastructure (pushing malicious script bypassing the auth) or hacking the account (author turning malicious). Both of those are hard with a properly configured system or not worth it because it requires a long game (like those of xz attack)





  • I know where you’re coming from when you say they are different. But I disagree on that because at the end of the day you’re still trusting other people would not act maliciously or get their account compromised. The selection process doesn’t make it any more special as demonstrated by xz in my example.

    Anyone can be an AUR submitter and maintainer. Act in good faith and never become an Arch maintainer. Someone can be an Arch maintainer and be good for a few years then something happened and their account got hacked or bad blood made them act rashly.

    That’s precisely what I mean when I equate AUR maintainer to the distro maintainer. To the package management system, they are both trusted. Not in the sense of how special they are or how strongly you can trust one but not the other.


  • Yes, and that is no different than distro maintainer that maintains the infrastructure and package. Anyone can volunteer. That’s how xz is compromised. The point is that aurto trust models mimic those of other package managers. Trusting the authors implicitly trust the code. The only other special things from distro maintainer is their PGP signatures are required to perform release on the main repo. This is better because as I stated earlier, reviewing PKGBUILDS would encourage people to just skip it. Not everyone has the time for that. But when a maintainer changes? Aurto removes the package for you to perform that first trust again on the new maintainer. This is no different than if you update the arch keyring just more manual



  • Edit: Sorry I realize my rambling didn’t answer your question. My suggestion is to not use aura. I do not see anywhere on their repo about their trust model or if they just do it like yay/paru. This is also why I recommend aurto and not aurutils. People would just skip the diff with aurutils.

    The thing is, aurto is not the helper. The helper is aurutils. aurto is just the local repo manager that adds timer to auto-update and some QoL features. But to add packages to that local repo, you need to add the maintainer to the trust list. That means the current attack of adopting orphaned / unmaintaned packages is moot. The maintainer change means the package are kicked out and not tracked anymore by aurto. You can still re-add them after you’ve confirmed that they’re safe.

    That being said, aurto do have issue. They trust the PKGBUILD of the author/maintainer so if the maintainer got hacked or gone rogue, it will not protect you. Same as with every other package manager in that case.